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Abstract
Remanufacturing is one of the recovery processes that transforms a used product into a “like-new” product, and
usually comes with similar warranty to the new product. Many manufacturers have concerns that remanufacturing
might cannibalize the sales of the new product. Recent development shows an increasing trend in selling products
through non-traditional channels such as manufacturer’s direct channel or e-channel. We develop a pricing decision
model for short life-cycle product in a closed-loop supply chain that consists of manufacturer, retailer, and collector.
New product is sold via traditional retail store and remanufactured product is sold via manufacturer’s direct channel,
such as factory outlet. We introduce two scaling factors; the first represents customer’s acceptance towards buying
remanufactured product, and the second represents customer’s preference to buy remanufactured product via direct
channel. The results show that implementing separate channel can improve the total supply chain’s profit compared
to single-channel approach. We also find that both scaling factors influence pricing decisions and the profits of the
supply chain members.
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1. Introduction
Most of the pricing models for new and remanufactured products use single sales channel, where both
products are sold in the same channel, and typically in a retail store. However, recent development shows
that there is an increasing trend in selling products through non-traditional channels such as
manufacturer’s direct channel (for example factory outlet or warehouse stores), and e-channel or online
stores. Dell computer sells its remanufactured product via online channel called “Dell Outlet” [1], while
offers new product via both retail stores and online market. Similar to Dell computer, Hewlett-
Packard/HP also sells the remanufactured computers in HP’s online outlet store, and customer cannot
buy it at retail store such as Best Buy, as revealed by [2]. He argues that OEM usually sells
remanufactured product in different sales channel from new product to reduce the effect of
cannibalization. Atasu et al. suggest that pricing strategy for new and remanufactured product should
focus on market segmentation, where they recognized two main segments namely newness-conscious
segment and functionality-oriented segment [3]. The latter would be a potential market for
remanufactured product. Moreover, Atasu et al. claim that focusing remanufactured product sales to
functionality-oriented segment can improve the competition advantage against no-brand low cost product
that is targeting customers with lower the willingness-to-pay. Therefore, it is important to explore the
effect of offering new and remanufactured products in different channels to the pricing decision.
In this paper we will introduce two scaling factors that characterize the separate sales channel, i.e.
remanufacturing acceptance and customer's preference to buy remanufactured product in direct channel.
We would further develop a pricing decision model for this situation, and study the effects of separating
sales channel for new and remanufactured product to the supply chain’s profit.
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2. Literature review
Pricing strategy for dual channel in supply chain has been studied quite extensively. Most of the
published works are dealing with pricing decision for single product that are sold in two different
channels, namely traditional wall and brick stores, and internet or direct channel stores. Substitute
products are also considered in some research. However, only a limited works explore pricing decision
in a closed-loop supply chain with dual sales channel.
There are several works focusing on optimal pricing strategies for dual channel, and most of them use
deterministic demand. Huang & Swaminathan assume a deterministic demand model where demand on
a channel is affected by market potential, prices, and degree of substitution across channel [4]. They also
consider the degree of autonomy for internet channel. The results provided are sub-optimal yet prevalent
pricing strategies. In addition to pricing strategy, Dan et al. examine the effect of optimal decisions to
retail services, both in centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chain [5]. Stackelberg
sequential game is applied to the decentralized approach where manufacturer is the leader and retailer is
the follower. It is shown that retail services strongly affect manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing strategies
and profits. They also reveal that the degree of customer loyalty to the retail channel have significant
effect on the retail services and pricing decisions. Zhang et al. study pricing decisions in a dual-channel
system under different power structures, which are Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and
Vertical Nash. The effect of product substitutability and relative channel status on pricing decisions are
investigated under these power structures. It is shown that customer always get the most benefit from the
vertical Nash game, while no power structure is always the best for the entire supply chain [6]. Chen et
al. consider pricing policies in a supply chain with one manufacturer who sells a product via a retailer
and internet channel, and the retailer also sells a substitute product made by another manufacturer. The
pricing decisions are compared between Nash and Stackelberg game settings. They study the effect of
model parameters to the profits, i.e. self-price sensitivity, cross-brand price sensitivity, and service level
[7]. Hsiao & Chen study the case where not only manufacturer has the option to operate the Internet
channel, but also retailer, or both. They classify customers into two segments, namely grocery shoppers
and Internet shoppers, in which the title represents customer’s channel preference. There are three
strategies considered in the pricing decisions, which are grocery encroachment strategy, channel
separation strategy with interior optimum, and channel separation strategy with corner optimum solution
[8].
Pricing decision in dual-channel system also considers contracts. Cai et al. focus on simple price
discount contracts in the pricing decision; while the dual-channel supply chain competition is discussed
under game theory framework consists of Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Nash
game [9]. The results show that simple price contracts can improve supply chain performance under
different game situations. There are two channel pricing strategies considered, i.e. consistent and
inconsistent pricing. It is shown that consistent pricing may improve the Stackelberg leader. Furthermore,
complementary agreement, such as profit sharing or two-part tariff; and this scheme brings a win-win
solution for both parties.
The study on dual-channel system in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing is scarce, even
though several authors claim that market segmentation and channel separation can reduce cannibalization
effect, in terms that lower priced remanufactured product might cannibalize the sales of the new product.
Widodo et al. examine the financial benefit in applying two scenarios for sales return under dual sales
channel structure [10]. They use two game theoretic approaches, which are Bertrand scheme and
Stackelberg leader scheme. The first is a simultaneous pricing decision making, while the latter is a
sequential decision with a leader and a follower. The results show that simultaneous process always
performs better in terms of total channel profit. Ma et al. explore the effect of government-funded
consumption-subsidy to the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain [11]. There are two types of customer,
primary customer – who does not own an obsolete product and can purchase a new product directly; and
replacement customer – who owns an obsolete product and should sell it before purchasing a new one.
Manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader over the followers, i.e. the retailer and the e-tailer. The results
indicated that the consumption-subsidy can increase the scale of closed-loop supply chain. Also, the
manufacturer and the retailer get benefit from the subsidy, while the e-tailer’s benefit is uncertain.
The closest work to ours is a study by Jiang et al. who investigate pricing strategy in a dual-channel
supply chain system with remanufacturing using an agent-based modeling, due to the complexity of the
system [12]. Also, in order to reduce the computational load in the process of finding optimal prices, a
learning search algorithm is designed and implemented within the multi-agent supply chain model. They
find that optimal profits can be improved by introducing direct channel and remanufactured product. The
model parameters are also observed, consists of customer preference, direct channel cost, and
remanufacturing cost, in order to find the effects on optimal prices and profits. Clearly, our work differs
from Jiang’s in three ways. First, Jiang’s work only consider a manufacturer and a retailer, while our
work includes a collector of used product. Second, we develop an analytical model that include several
parameters to demonstrate the system behavior, and the optimum is found based on the characteristics of
the model designed, not based on simulation. Third, we consider a short life-cycle product, where the
demand is represented by a time dependent deterministic function to contain the short life cycle pattern.
Therefore, our contribution is affirmed.
This study is an extension to the authors’ pricing decision model under single channel approach [13],
where new and remanufactured products are sold via the same sales channel. We would like to study the
effect of separating the sales channel to the total profits of the supply chain.
3. Problem Definition
A closed-loop supply chain consists of three members, namely a manufacturer, a retailer, and a
collector. The closed-loop is initiated by a manufacturer who makes new product that is sold at a
wholesale price to the retailer. The new product is then released to the market by the retailer at a
retail price . After a certain period of time, some products reach their end-of-use and become the
objects of used products collection. The used product would be acquired by the collector under a certain
acquisition price, . We assume that the collector only collects used products that meet the required
quality level for the remanufacturing process. Therefore, all collected returns are transferred to the
manufacturer at a price , as the input for remanufacturing process. The remanufactured product is then
sold via manufacturer’s direct channel such as factory outlet or warehouse store, at a price . The closed-
loop separate channel system can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The closed-loop separate channel system
The product considered in this model is single item, short life-cycle, with obsolescence effect after a
certain period, in term of obsolescence in function and desirability. Demand patterns are time-dependent
functions which represent the short life-cycle pattern along the entire phases of product life-cycle, both
for new and remanufactured products; and linear in price.
There are four time-frames considered in this model, as depicted in Figure 2. In the first interval [0,
t1], only new product is offered to the market. In second and third interval, i.e. [t1, ] and [, t3], both
new and remanufactured products are offered. The difference between second and third interval is on the
segments of life-cycle phases for both types. During second interval, both new and remanufactured
products are at the introduction-growth-maturity phases. In the third interval, the new product has entered
the decline phase while remanufactured product has not. In the fourth interval [t3, T], manufacturer has
stopped producing new product and only offers remanufactured product which is assumed to be on the
decline phase. The functions that represents these demand patterns are shown in [13]. The demand
potentials for new and remanufactured product are the demand volumes accumulated over those four
time-frames, excluding the effect of price sensitivity.
The total demands can be constructed by considering demand potentials, price sensitivity, and cross-
channel sensitivity. Since cross-channel is also followed by a switch in customer’s choice from buying
new product to remanufactured one, a parameter that represents the scaling factor for remanufacturing
acceptance is introduced in the model. These demand functions are similar to the ones in [8]. We apply
two market segments based on Atasu et al. i.e. newness-conscious or high-end customers, and
functionality-oriented or low-end customers [3].
Let be the customer’s valuation to the new product,
 High-end customers would buy new product in retail stores when ≥
 High-end customers would buy remanufactured product in manufacturer’s direct channel if ≥
and − ≥ −
 Low-end customers would buy remanufactured product in manufacturer’s direct channel if ≥
and − ≥ −
We assume that low-end customers would not buy new product, because the price of new product is
most likely higher than the price of remanufactured product ([2],[14][15][16]), and it is beyond their
willingness to pay.
Figure 2. Demand pattern of a product with gradual obsolescence, over time
The scaling factor for remanufactured product, , represents the devaluation of remanufactured
product in high-end customer’s view, as a result of quality perception. Remanufactured product is often
perceived to be inferior to new product; therefore it has lower value in consumer’s willingness to pay
([2],[17]). For example, let = 0.7, it means high-end customer values remanufactured product 70%
of the product valuation, and he/she would only buy if the price offered ( ) is lower than his/her
valuation. Furthermore, when the utility of buying new product is higher ( − > − ), customer
would not buy remanufactured product despite the positive utility ( ≥ ).
The scaling factor for customer valuation to the remanufactured product sold via direct channel, ,
represents the preference of low-end customers to purchase remanufactured product via direct channel.
Customer tends to believe that factory outlet or warehouse stores operated directly by manufacturer
would offer a lower price compared to the same product sold in a retail store, because of double
marginalization. Therefore, customers who favor in functionality over newness would have higher
preference when remanufactured product is sold via direct channel. Moreover, the green segment
customer would prefer to purchase remanufactured product. They would find it easier and more
convenient to locate the product when it is offered in a different sales channel. On the other hand, since
new and remanufactured products are not offered hand-in-hand on the same location, the chance of
cannibalization is reduced. Customer who has the intention to buy a new product would proceed to a
retail store, with a lower risk to switch to buy remanufactured product.
After incorporating the scaling factors, the demand function is constructed for both segments. The
product is assumed to be a high quality product such that low-end customer’s willingness to pay is lower
than the price of new product. Therefore, demand of new product is typically comes from high-end
customer, while demand of remanufactured product would mostly come from low-end customer. There
exists a channel interplay, where high-end customer might switch to buy remanufactured product, under
a certain circumstances. On the other hand, we make an assumption that none of the low-end customer
who decided to buy remanufactured product would switch to buy new product, since it is higher than
their valuation or willingness to pay.
Demand of the new product can be expressed as
where is the cumulative demand potential of new product during [0, t3] (see Fig.2). The condition
where “ is zero when ≥ ” represents the absence of channel interplay from to . The
condition where “price of new product becomes too high that high-end customer will not buy new
product” is implied in (1b), i.e. = ; and = 0 when = .
Demand function for remanufactured product is
where is the cumulative demand potential of remanufactured product during [t1, T] as in Figure 2.
The condition where is zero when ≥ , represents a condition where the price of
remanufactured product is too high, exceeding low-end customer’s valuation or willingness to pay.
The optimal prices are found by applying the Stackelberg pricing game. It is started with the
manufacturer as the leader, releasing the wholesale price and remanufactured product’s price (reman
price). This information is then used by the retailer, along with observation to the market demand, to
decide the optimal retail price of the new product. Collector, on the other hand, observes the demand of
remanufactured product and decides the optimal acquisition price. The collected used products are then
transferred to the manufacturer, who further decides the wholesale prices for both new product sold to
retailer and for reman price sold via direct channel.
4. Optimization Modeling
The optimization is carried out under sequential Stackelberg game with manufacturer as the leader.
The objective of the pricing model is finding optimal prices that maximize profits. Since the demand
functions are piecewise functions which are defined by different expressions at different interval, we
need to consider the price decision for each interval. Four scenarios are introduced based on retailer’s
optimum retail price.
4.1. Retailer’s Optimization
Retailer only sells new product, and the sales quantity follows in equation (1). We have two
intervals for reman price that determine the demand profile, which are ≤ and ≤ ≤ .
Retailer’s optimization will be conducted for these two intervals.
4.1.1. Retailer’s optimization for ≤
This interval implies that the price of remanufactured product sold via direct channel is lower than
high-end customer’s valuation. Hence, there would be a shift in high-end customer’s preference. A
= ⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 12 − −1 − 1 ; ≤ 1 . ……………………………… (1a)12 [ − ] ; 1 ≤ ≤ 2 . .……………………… (1b)0 ; ≥ 2
= ⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 1 34 − 2 + 12 −1 − 1 − 1 ; ≤ 1 ………… (2a)34 − 2 ; 1 ≤ ≤ 2 ………… (2b)0 ; ≥ 2
customer who originally intends to buy new product, purchases remanufactured product in the end. The
new product demand follows (1a), and the retailer’s optimization problem isMax Π = − ( − ) ……………………. (3)
It is obvious that Π is concave in , thus there exists optimal retail price that maximize the retailer’s
profit. Taking the first derivative condition yields∗ = ( ) …………………….. (4)
Since ≤ then≤ ( ) …………………….. (5)
Inequality (5) puts a restriction on reman price based on the manufacturer’s initial released wholesale
price and customer’s maximum willingness to pay.
4.1.2. Retailer’s optimization for ≤ ≤
Under this condition, the price of remanufactured product is higher than high-end customer’s
valuation, so they would not be interested in purchasing reman product. On the other hand, reman price
is still lower than low-end customer’s valuation. Demand of new product follows (1b) and the retailer’s
profit function isMax Π = [ − ]( − ) …………………….. (6)
Since Π is concave in , thus there exists optimal retail price that maximize the retailer’s profit and the
first derivative condition is∗ = …………………….. (7)
This result is the same as the single channel approach in [13], where channel interplay does not exist.
In this model, we consider two separate channel with a possibility of channel interplay, but in the second
interval of reman price, the channel interplay diminishes. This approach is called channel separation
strategy [8].
Furthermore, applying the restriction on reman price based on interval in gives≤ ≤ …………………….. (8)
and therefore ( ) ≤ …………………….. (9)
After determining optimal retail price based on two different intervals of reman price in demand
function, we are able to find restriction for reman price based on the manufacturer’s initial released
wholesale price and customer’s maximum willingness to pay. These restrictions further create four
regions for reman price that leads to four scenarios, as seen on Figure 3.
 Scenario I: ≤ ( )
Demand of the new product follows (1a) and demand of the reman product follows (2a). Optimal
retail price is (4)
 Scenario II: ( ) ≤ ≤
This scenario uses the boundary value of reman price, = . In order to encourage channel
separation, we use demand functions (1b) for new product and (2b) for reman product. The optimal retail
price is the corner point∗ = …………………….. (10)
 Scenario III: ≤ ≤
This scenario finds optimum reman price within interior points of ≤ ≤ . Demand of the
new product follows (1b) and demand of the reman product follows (2b). Optimal retail price is (7)
 Scenario IV: ≥
This scenario uses the other boundary value of reman price, = . Demand of the new product
follows (1b) and demand of the reman product follows (2b). The optimal retail price is∗ = …………………….. (11)
Figure 3. Reman price regions that leads to four scenarios
4.2. Collector’s Optimization
In collector’s optimization we apply an increasing return function that depends on the acquisition
price, similar to [18]. The return function is represented by Θ( ) = , where > 0 is a constant
coefficient, and ∈ [0,1] is the exponent of the power function in return rate function, which determine
the curve’s steepness. This function indicates that collected returns is a portion of new product’s sales,
and the portion (or return rate) increases as acquisition price increases. Therefore, the collector should
determine optimal acquisition price that would be high enough to acquire the needed quantity of returns,
yet not too high as it would reduce the collector’s profit. We use balanced quantity throughout the supply
chain, so the collector only acquires as much as the demand of the remanufactured product. We have
made an assumption that the collector would only collect used product that meet the quality criteria for
remanufacturing process. Another assumption is made for the number of remanufacturing process
applied to a product. We assume that used product collected should be originated from new product,
which suggests single or one-time remanufacturing process for each product. A parameter is introduced
here, , unit collecting cost. The optimization is carried out for all scenarios.
4.2.1. Scenario I: ≤ ( )
The collector’s optimization problem isMax Π = − − − …………………….. (12)
The collector’s profit function is concave and the optimum collecting price is∗ = ( ) …………………….. (13)
Applying balanced quantity yields− + − = − …………………….. (14)
Substituting with (13), we find
∗ = ∗ ( )∗ ∙ + …………………….. (15)
with as in (4)
4.2.2. Scenario II: ( ) ≤ ≤
The collector’s optimization problem in this scenario isMax Π = ( − ) − − …………………….. (16)
The collector’s profit function is concave and the optimum collecting price is the same as (13). The
optimal acquisition price in scenario II is the same as in scenario I, because the demand function does
not have contribution is fulfilling the first derivative condition. Furthermore, applying balanced quantity
gives − = [ − ] …………………….. (17)
Substituting with (13) and with (10), we find
∗ = ∙ + …………………….. (18)
4.2.3. Scenario III: ≤ ≤
The collector’s optimization problem in this scenario is the same as scenario II, which is given in
(16), so is the balanced quantity as in (17). Therefore the optimal acquisition price is (13). Substituting
with the optimum and with (7), we get
∗ = ∙ + …………………….. (19)
4.2.4. Scenario IV: ≥
In the fourth scenario, the collector’s optimization problem is also the same as scenario II, which is
given in (16), as well as the balanced quantity as in (17). Therefore the optimal acquisition price is (13),
and by using as in (11) we are able to express the transfer price as∗ = ∙ + …………………….. (20)
4.3. Manufacturer’s Optimization
The optimal prices determined by the retailer and the collector become inputs in manufacturer’s
optimization in order to maximize his/her profit. The optimization problem isMax, Π = ( − − ) + − − …………………….. (21)
where is unit raw material cost for producing new product, is unit manufacturing cost for
producing new product, and is unit remanufacturing cost for producing and selling remanufactured
product in manufacturer’s direct channel.
4.3.1. Scenario I: ≤ ( )
In manufacturer’s optimization, reman price is a decision variable, therefore it is necessary to
impose its restriction on each scenario. The restrictions become the constraints to the optimization
problem.
The optimization problem in scenario I is then stated as follows:Max, Π = − ∗ ( − − ) + − + ∗ − −∗ − …………………….. (22)
subject to
(1) Reman price restriction for scenario I: ≤ ( )
(2) Supply constraint: − ∗ ≥ − + ∗ −
(3) Lower bound: ≥ _ ; ≥ __ and _ are the initial wholesale and reman price released to the retailer and collector.
(4) Upper bound: ≤ (1 − ) +
where ∗ and ∗ are expressions given in (4) and (15), respectively.
This optimization problem is solved by computational approach because it becomes too complex for
analytical approach and for finding closed-form solutions. We utilize Matlab for finding the solutions.
4.3.2. Scenario II: ( ) ≤ ≤
In this scenario, we use demand functions (1b) for new product and (2b) for reman product, in order
to encourage channel separation. Since in scenario II ∗ = / , the manufacturer’s profit function
becomesΠ = − ( − − ) + − − ∗ −
It is obvious that the optimization process would seek the largest possible value for to maximize
the profit function. Therefore, the optimum must occur on the boundary, i.e.= ( )
The optimization problem in scenario II becomes
Max, Π = − ( − − ) + − − ∗ − …………… (23)
subject to
(1) Reman price restriction in scenario II that provide the largest : = ( )
(2) Supply constraint: − ≥ −
(3) Upper bound: ≤
where ∗ is the expression given in (18).
Similar to scenario I, this optimization problem is solved by computational approach due to its
complexity
4.3.3. Scenario III: ≤ ≤
In scenario III, we use demand functions (1b) for new product and (2b) for reman product, and ∗ =
. The optimization problem becomeMax, Π = ( − − ) + − − ∗ − …………… (24)
subject to
(1) Reman price restriction for scenario III: ( ) ≤ ≤ ( )
(2) Supply constraint: ≥ −
(3) Upper bound: ≤
where ∗ is the expression given in (19).
4.3.4. Scenario IV: ≥
In this scenario, reman price is high but is still within customer’s willingness to pay. The model also
take demand functions (1b) for new product and (2b) for reman product. Since in scenario IV, ∗ =/ , the manufacturer’s profit function becomesΠ = − ( − − ) + − − ∗ −
Since the profit function is linearly increasing in , the optimization process would seek the largest
possible value for to obtain maximum profit. Therefore, the optimum must occur on the boundary,
i.e. = .
Supply constraint can be omitted because − ≥ − implies ≥ , which is
obviously always true.
The optimization problem in scenario IV becomesMax Π = ( − − ) + − ∗ − …………… (25)
subject to upper bound: ≤
where ∗ is the expression given in (20).
5. Numerical Example
Let the demand-potential’s parameters for new product and remanufactured product be the same as
the numerical example in the single channel approach in [13]. Selling horizon is one year and divided
into four periods where t1=1, =2, t3=3, and T=4 in trimester units. The unit raw material cost for new
product crw=1500, unit manufacturing cost cm=1000, unit remanufacturing cost cr=800, and unit
collecting cost c=100. Maximum price is Pm=12000. Price and costs are given in thousands rupiah.
Return rate parameters are =0.01, and =0.7. Remanufacturing acceptance ( ) and scaling factor for
customer valuation in remanufactured product sold via direct channel ( ) for scenario I, II, III, IV are
(0.8, 0.9), (0.7 and 0.8), (0.6 and 0.8), and (0.5 and 0.6), respectively. The results are given in Table 1.
Manufacturer’s profit is much higher than retailer in separate channel system, because she sells both new




Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Single channel
[13]
0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50
0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60
7,700.00 8,571.43 9,500.00 10,000.00 9,889.78
6,346.70 5,647.74 5,673.33 5,597.54 8,318.83
7,120.05 6,888.65 6,911.08 6,658.48 7,018.45
729.03 366.10 389.80 248.25 422.04
1,870.49 989.10 1,046.67 702.89 1,124.96Π 4,948,745.78 4,090,846.09 3,291,706.88 2,714,894.15 2,391,233.07Π 505,607.36 961,102.81 1,078,173.11 1,113,281.64 1,246,142.45Π 205,065.44 186,107.37 150,977.65 56,087.71 145,869.03
Total profit 5,659,418.58 5,238,056.27 4,520,857.64 3,884,263.50 3,783,244.55
871.81 571.14 416.46 333.17 351.53
196.90 390.67 308.02 211.20 150.73
From the results in Table 1 we are able to show that applying separate channel can improve the total
supply chain profit, compared to authors’ previous model with single-channel approach [13]. In the
single-channel model, the optimum remanufactured product’s price is quite high because the product is
offered through the same channel as new product, i.e. retail store. Therefore, double marginalization
exists and it pulls the remanufactured product’s price up and decreases the demand.
The scaling factor that represents remanufacturing acceptance, , significantly influence pricing
decisions and the profits of the supply chain members. It can be observed that lower remanufacturing
acceptance leads to higher retail price. This is understandable because high-end customer is more
reluctant to purchase reman product, and the retailer responds to it by increasing the retail price.
However, higher retail price would decrease new product’s demand. Even though retailer’s profit is
improving, manufacturer’s profit is hurt by the small quantity of new product. Despite the potential profit
gain that comes from reman product, manufacturer must consider the supply constraint that puts a
limitation to reman quantity.
When reman acceptance is high, the optimization would likely fall into first scenario, which shows
the best performance in terms of total supply chain’s profit. In fact, manufacturer receives the most
benefit from this scenario, but retailer does not. As remanufacturing acceptance gets higher, the chance
of high-end customer switches from new to reman is also increasing. Retailer responds to it by lowering
the retail price, to attract more high-end customer, and deter switching. However, as the Stackelberg
leader, manufacturer optimize her profit after receiving retailer’s pricing decision. Manufacturer finds
optimal reman price that is higher than the initial reman price released to retailer. Therefore, the demand
decreases for reman product but increases for new product. Since retailer has already priced the new
product relatively low, her profit is relatively low, even though it is better than the initial condition when
new product’s demand is low. Collector can also benefits from this scenario, but not in consistent way.
In this scenario, demand for reman product is high during retailer’s optimization. Consequently, it is
responded by high acquisition price, followed by high transfer price. Even though first scenario performs
best, there is a limitation to it. If remanufacturing acceptance is very high, the reman product’s demand
can be too high that collector cannot acquired enough used product for remanufacturing process due to
the supply constraint. This is a limitation to our model. Therefore, it is our intention to further explore a
pricing strategy that includes green segment consideration, where reman price can be set higher than new
product; and a condition where there is a switch from reman to new product.
Scenario II, III, and IV support channel separation strategy, where the effect of channel interplay is
minimized. Scenario II is implemented when reman price lies at the borderline of switching from new to
reman. When reman price is quite high relatively to high-end customer, then channel separation is
naturally formed, and this is captured in scenario III. Scenario IV is applied on a situation where reman
acceptance is low, customer preference to shop via direct channel is also low, while reman price is quite
high but still at the borderline of no demand situation. The model would respond with pricing decision
that placed new product and reman product according to the channel selection. There is a threshold for
remanufacturing acceptance, as well as low-end customer preference to shop via direct channel, such
that below those thresholds, selling reman product is no longer profitable.
The collector’s optimum result is not following remanufacturing acceptance trend. As
remanufacturing acceptance decreases, acquisition price and collector’s profit changes inconclusively.
Scenario I gives the best result to the collector. This can be explained by the high demand in reman
product during retailer’s optimization that is responded by collector’s decision to collect high amount of
returns. The attempt to collect sufficient used product is achieved by putting a high acquisition price that
would be interesting enough for customer to sell their end-of-use product. Consequently, higher
acquisition price is followed by higher transfer price, hence higher collector’s profit.
Scenario III is the most similar case to model I. In the first model, even though new and reman
products are sold through the same channel, but we did not consider cannibalization. The term
cannibalization refers to a situation where a customer who initially plan to buy new product, but since
reman product becomes more attractive then he/she ends up buying reman product. It usually is caused
by reman product’s lower price is very attractive to low-end or functionality-oriented customer. In this
separate channel system, scenario III is only applied when reman price is within a certain interval
between high-end customer’s valuation towards reman product, and low-end customer’s willingness to
pay.
Scenario IV works best for the retailer because it is implemented on a situation where
remanufacturing acceptance is low. Therefore, retailer can set a higher retail price. Despite lower demand
caused by high retail price, retailer’s profit is higher than the other scenarios.
The effect of scaling factor for customer preference in remanufactured product sold via direct channel
( ) can also be investigated through the results in Table 1. Scenario IV would be effective on lower .
In this case, retail price is high and reman price is low compared to scenario I and III. Since the demand
of new and reman product are also low, the total supply chain’s profit is depleted. This is understandable
because scenario IV is the strategy for a situation that is very close to no demand. However, collector
suffers the most. When retailer can still benefit from high retail price despite low demand of new product,
manufacturer still gain from selling both products, collector is hurt by small quantity of reman product’s
demand as well as low reman price, which means low transfer price. When we focus on the effect of
within the same scenario, it can be observed that the lower , the reman price, acquisition price, and
transfer are getting lower, but retail price and wholesale price do not change, within the same scenario.
However, when the scenario changes, lower leads to higher retail price.
6. Conclusion and Future Research
Pricing decision for a closed-loop supply chain with separate channel system has been presented. We
develop the pricing model under four scenarios according to reman price: (a) it is lower than customer’s
valuation towards reman product, (b) it is at the borderline of customer’s switch from new to reman (c)
it lies between customer’s valuation towards reman product, and low-end customer’s willingness to pay,
and (d) it is at the borderline of no demand situation. The optimization process is a sequential Stackelberg
pricing game, with manufacturer as the leader. We found closed-form solutions for retailer’s and
collector’s optimization, but for manufacturer’s we use computational approach due to the complexity in
the model. Two model parameters are studied, which are scaling factor for remanufacturing acceptance
( ) and scaling factor for customer preference in remanufactured product sold via direct channel ( ).
The results shows several points as follows
1. Pricing decision for new and reman products in a closed-loop supply chain with separate channel
system can improve the total supply chain’s profit compared to single-channel approach.
2. We propose four scenarios to tackle different reman price range, which improves the supply chain’s
profit profile. First scenario shows the best performance for manufacturer, but the opposite for
retailer. Fourth scenario is the best one for retailer; while for collector, it is the worst.
3. Scenario II, III, and IV support channel separation strategy, where the effect of channel interplay is
minimized
There are limitations to our study. First, we do not consider green segment. When reman price is quite
high, the model leads to a no-demand situation. Second, in the absence of green segment, the switch from
customer purchasing reman product to buying new product is not possible. Third, we assume balance
quantity throughout the selling horizon, therefore the dynamic of product’s quantity is not explored, as
well as the inventory and salvage consequences. Fourth, this model use deterministic demand, while in
reality, demand is random. These limitations can be explored in detail, and those would be avenues for
further studies.
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